

# THE *Dan Smoot Report*



DAN SMOOT

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## OUTER SPACE TREATY

Communists do not negotiate treaties in good faith to solve international problems or promote peace. When we sign treaties with communists, we consider ourselves bound to a specified course of action. Communists ignore their pledges, violating the treaties when they please; but we never retaliate.

Consider, for example, U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreements to stop nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. From 1958 to 1963, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy prohibited American nuclear tests (badly needed for our national security). They were keeping a moratorium agreement with the Soviets, trying to persuade the Soviets to sign a Test Ban Treaty to make the moratorium permanent. The Soviets violated the moratorium agreement freely,<sup>(1)</sup> conducting tests to develop a defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles — a defense which we desperately need but have denied ourselves.

In July, 1963 — having achieved a dangerous lead over us in research and development on a missile-killer weapon — the Soviets signed the Test Ban Treaty to keep us from conducting the kind of testing they had already completed. Leading American military men and scientists objected; but, on September 24, 1963, the Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of 81-19.

Since then, the Soviets have violated the Test Ban Treaty at will, and with impunity. For example, on November 11, 1966, our government asked the Soviets to explain a gigantic underground explosion which dumped radio-active materials on nations beyond Soviet borders. The Soviet explanation was not satisfactory, but the U.S. government did nothing, and kept the public in ignorance of the incident. On December 18, 1966, the Soviets set off a nuclear explosion which scattered radio-active debris over Finland. About a month later, the U.S. government quietly asked the Soviets for an explanation, but has never revealed whether one was given.<sup>(2)</sup>

American liberals still acclaim the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 a significant triumph of diplomacy. President Johnson cites it as proof that we can negotiate successfully with the Soviets, and uses it as a steppingstone for more treaties and agreements.

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The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 is among the propaganda progeny of the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The Soviets were preparing for violations of the Outer Space Treaty while it was being negotiated. They have openly violated it since it was adopted. Our government belittles the importance of Soviet violations, denying, in fact, that they are violations. The chronology of events is interesting.

**I**n October, 1963 — less than a month after the Senate had ratified the Test Ban Treaty — the United States announced adherence to a UN General Assembly Outer Space Resolution banning the “Placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”<sup>(3)</sup>

The Soviets announced compliance, but asserted that, though the UN resolution prohibited the *orbiting* of weapons of mass destruction, it did not outlaw “the manufacture of such missiles.”<sup>(3)</sup>

On November 7, 1965, a three-stage missile (code name: SCRAG) was displayed in Moscow during the Bolshevik Revolution Day parade. Both *Tass* and *Izvestiya* described this weapon as an orbital missile. The U.S. Department of State asked Soviet officials whether they still intended to abide by their UN pledge not to use orbital weapons. The Soviets replied that the UN agreement did not prevent *development* of orbital weapons.<sup>(3)</sup>

In May, 1966, President Johnson proposed an Outer Space Treaty to outlaw orbital missiles — already outlawed by the UN Outer Space resolution. The UN Outer Space Committee started negotiations.<sup>(4)</sup>

On September 17, 1966, the Soviets fired into orbit a rocket which exploded into hundreds of pieces in several different orbits. A similar shot was made on November 2, 1966. The Soviets did not announce these two nuclear shots, and never explained them. Whether the rockets exploded by accident or by design is not known. Western

experts guessed that the Soviets were trying to *conceal* the tests.<sup>(5)</sup>

The American public was kept in ignorance of the Soviet tests.

The Outer Space Committee of the United Nations completed an Outer Space Treaty, and the UN General Assembly adopted it by acclamation on December 19, 1966 (one day after the Soviets had violated the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 with an explosion which spread radio-active material on Finland).

On January 25, 1967, the Soviets fired the third shot in their series of orbital bomb tests. This one did not explode. Whereas the Soviets had been secretive about the first two shots, they rather elaborately announced this third one, indicating to western experts that the Soviets *wanted* western powers to know about the series of tests.<sup>(5)</sup>

Two days later (January 27), the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and 60 other nations signed the Outer Space Treaty which repeats the prohibitions contained in the UN Outer Space resolution of October, 1963 — and contains other provisions about safe return of astronauts and space equipment which may land outside their national territories, and about responsibility for damages that may result from firing objects into space.

Diplomatic officials anticipated some Senate opposition to the Outer Space Treaty, because of the “difficulty” of inspecting Soviet military spacecraft for the presence of nuclear weapons — but expressed confidence that the treaty posed no threat to our national security, because our military would somehow manage to detect the orbiting of any “sizable system” of weapons.<sup>(4)</sup>

Administration fears about the Senate were groundless. On April 25, 1967, the Senate ratified the Outer Space Treaty by unanimous vote. Three weeks later (May 17), the Soviets fired into orbit the fourth missile in the series of tests to perfect their orbital weapon. As in the case of the third shot, the Soviets announced this fourth one, as if wanting the West to know they were violating the Outer Space Treaty that the U.S. Senate

had just ratified. Between May 17 and September 22, the Soviets fired 5 more missiles into orbit.<sup>(5)</sup>

On October 10, 1967, President Johnson held a ceremony in the White House to proclaim formal initiation of the Outer Space Treaty — 84 nations having signed it.<sup>(6)</sup> Eight days later, the Soviets fired into orbit the tenth missile in their orbital-weapon test series.<sup>(5)</sup>

On October 28, 1967, the Soviets fired the eleventh rocket into orbit; and the Johnson administration decided, after 14 months of silence, to say something about the ominous series of tests.<sup>(5)</sup>

On November 3, 1967, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, said U.S. officials had concluded *in the last month or so* that the Soviets were developing a space vehicle to orbit the earth, carrying nuclear bombs that can be brought down on target, anywhere on earth, at command. He said the Soviets could put such an orbital weapon into operation early in 1968.

McNamara called the Soviet weapon a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), because it would not “normally” make a full orbit of the earth, but would make only a fractional, or partial, orbit before being fired at a target. He said FOBS does not violate the Outer Space Treaty, because that treaty prohibits use of space for nuclear weapons that make *complete* orbits around the earth.<sup>(5)</sup>

This legal technicality is not only deceptive but ludicrous. Whether the Soviets strike us with a bomb that makes a fractional orbit or with one that makes a hundred full orbits, will be determined entirely by their own calculation of what is best for them — and not by the terms of any treaty. Moreover, a bomb that makes only a partial orbit is as destructive as one that makes many full orbits, and is equally difficult to counter.

McNamara claims we now have over-the-horizon radar which will give us at least as much warning (15 minutes) of attack from an orbital bomb as other radar gives of attack from an intercontinental ballistic missile. That is false. He says

our new radar will “deny” the Soviets the “capability” of striking American bomber bases and similar targets. That is false. He implies the U.S. has weapons which can stop incoming orbital bombs. That is false.

At best, radar can warn that an attack is coming; it cannot stop the attack. Even if we detect the orbiting of a vehicle capable of carrying a nuclear bomb, we cannot know whether it carries a bomb. Even if we know it carries a bomb, we cannot know whether the bomb will attack us. Even if we know the bomb will attack us, we cannot know when or where until the bomb is within 500 miles of its target. At that point, a rocket motor will be fired to pull the bomb out of orbit and start it hurtling toward the earth, where it will strike its target within 3 minutes. We will have a maximum of 3 minutes (not the 15 McNamara claims) to determine that a bomb has been pulled out of orbit, to calculate its speed and trajectory toward the earth, and to intercept it before it is close enough to inflict damage. We have spent billions on research and development for a Nike X anti-missile system intended to protect us against Soviet missiles; for more than 2 years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff has unanimously urged that the system be produced and installed; Congress has been willing to appropriate money for the system; but the Johnson administration has vetoed it.

McNamara concluded his November 3, 1967, statement about the Soviet orbital bomb with this paragraph:

“With three-minute warning, 15-minute warning, or no warning at all, we could still absorb a surprise attack and strike back with sufficient power to destroy the attacker. We have that capability today; we will continue to have it in the future.”<sup>(5)</sup>

McNamara neglected to say that the attack which we could “absorb” might kill as many as 120 million Americans.<sup>(3)</sup> He is “not concerned” about the loss of lives. His computer, or something, tells him that we would have enough people and weapons left to strike back and destroy an enemy before he could finish us.

There is the essence of the Johnson administration's defense policies — not to protect the American homeland or maintain weapon superiority over the Soviets, but to keep enough scattered power to strike back *after* millions of Americans have already been killed.<sup>(3)</sup>

On December 13, 1967, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., director of research and engineering for the Defense Department, said the United States has a "space bus," which can drop hydrogen bombs on targets anywhere in the world. The "space bus" is actually a cluster of maneuverable missile warheads, all launched by one ballistic missile on a ballistic trajectory. As in the case of the Soviet FOBS, our "space bus" is technically not a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, because its warheads strike their targets before circling the earth.<sup>(7)</sup>

The Outer Space Treaty outlaws space weapons. If we admit, as Foster did, that our new missile cluster is a space weapon, why do we deny, as McNamara did, that the Soviet FOBS is a space weapon?

Obviously, the Outer Space Treaty gives the world no protection against space warfare. On the contrary, it gives government officials pretext for lying about defense activities, keeps the public in confused darkness about the security of the nation, gives a fearsome advantage to the nation most ruthlessly cynical about its own treaty obligations.

By signing the Outer Space Treaty, we promised not to use space for military purposes — knowing full well that military use of space could become vital to the survival of our nation; knowing full well that the Soviets can and will use space as they please, contemptuous of their treaty pledges and contemptuous of us for placing our trust in them.

We need a Congress and a President who will reverse the defense policies of the Johnson administration — and renounce the Test Ban Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty, on the grounds that communists have never honored their pledges.

NEXT WEEK: Nonproliferation Treaty.

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## FOOTNOTES

- (1) "The Summit and the Test Ban Fallacy," speech by U.S. Senator Thomas J. Dodd (Connecticut Democrat), *Congressional Record*, May 12, 1960, pp. 9412-23
- (2) *Human Events*, Nov. 4, 1967, p. 3
- (3) "The Changing Strategic Military Balance; U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R.," Committee On Armed Services, House Of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, July, 1967, 94 pp.
- (4) *The New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1967, pp. 1, 6
- (5) *The New York Times*, Nov. 4, 1967, pp. 1-3
- (6) *The New York Times*, Oct. 11, 1967, pp. 1, 3
- (7) *The New York Times*, Dec. 26, 1967, p. 23; *The Dallas Morning News*, Dec. 27, 1967, p. D3

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